Is it time to transcend political realism in the EU-Russia security cooperation? Exploring the critical realist model of emancipatory windows

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This article explores the possibilities of a novel methodological approach in the EU-Russia studies, namely the model of emancipatory windows based on critical realist philosophy. It is argued that the critical realist model can challenge the political realist hypothesis on the absolute gridlock of cooperation between the EU and Russia. The model reveals that collaboration between the two strategic partners is possible within narrow but deep sectors, that is, emancipatory windows, which are defined by three variables: materiality, normativity, and time. In terms of the Third Common Space on external security, an emancipatory window has opened for value-based joint action and operations aimed at the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. More specifically, it would be possible to incorporate and implement the UN-authorised principle of Responsibility to Protect in the road-map of the Third Common Space and in the successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The adoption of RtoP could lead to new forms of cooperation between the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Russia in crisis management, particularly in Africa. Thus, emancipation from the current deadlock in the EU-Russia relations does not necessitate completely new normative or concrete structures, that is, 'reinventing the wheel'. Instead, emancipation can be achieved by modifying and transforming the already existing CSDP-Russia structures.

Introduction

> Realism tends to emphasise the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies […]. [T]he highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to, these forces and these tendencies. (Carr 1946: 10)

If it is correct to say that political realism has been the dominant theory in International Relations (IR) research, with assumedly the greatest potential to explain international politics, then it is also true that political realism has suppressed and

overshadowed alternative explanatory approaches and theories in IR. This argument rings true particularly with regard to the EU-Russia studies, which have been guided more by the prevalent and implicit political realist 'story-telling' than by the realities of the research object — the EU-Russia relations *per se*. Both policymakers and IR theorists have produced and reproduced the story of universal and 'irresistible' forces standing in the way of improved relations between the EU and Russia, simultaneously subjugating the untold story of unused possibilities of cooperation between the two strategic partners.

Alexander Fomenko, a historian and political scientist, captures perfectly the conventional wisdom of political realism that prevails in the current thinking about the EU-Russia relations, although Fomenko himself underlines close cultural, historical and religious ties between the EU and Russia: 'Mutual lack of understanding between Russia and Western Europe of centuries-long standing is an irrefutable, even if lamentable, historical fact. So far, no agreements "on partnership and cooperation" and no "partnership for modernization" projects between Russia and the EU have overcome the inertia of mutual misunderstanding' (Fomenko 2012: 232). According to the conventional wisdom, then, the *longue durée* impediments stemming from political and historical deep structures still generate an 'irresistible' and 'inevitable' power (Carr 1946: 10), which effectively inhibits any attempt to forge the EU-Russia cooperation at the institutional surface level. Chairman of the State Duma Naryshkin (2012: 1) describes these *longue durée* factors from the perspective of a policymaker:

> The are no lines of a 'cold standoff' on geographic maps today. However, in the minds of some politicians, they disappear with great difficulty […]. Indeed, the confrontation logic is not completely gone, including from the Strasbourg organization [the Council of Europe].

Like their Russian counterparts, Western European researchers believe that the fundamental differences between the EU and Russia at the deeper level of values crucially impede their cooperation and convergence of policies at the institutional level. The EU's value system is commonly regarded as incompatible with the Russian human rights policy, as evidenced by the centralisation of political power in Russia; restrictions of independent media and freedom of expression in Russia; and bureaucratic and legal burdens imposed on civil society through complex laws which regulate NGOs and 'counter-extremist' activity (e.g., MacKinnon 2007; Korinman and Laughland 2008; White 2011: 278–80). Dysfunctional relations between the EU and Russia have culminated in the shallowness of the normative foundation of their cooperation and the prevailing policy of delimitation between the two strategic 'partners' (e.g., Prozorov 2006; Haukkala 2010).

Close economic ties and energy interdependence[1] between the EU and Russia add to the dilemma as an aggravating, rather than ameliorating, factor, although the EU and Russia maintain in their official rhetoric that such interdependence enhances

functional integration between the two strategic partners. As Pyotr Iskenderov points out, 'The EU, or at least its leaders, look at Russia as an "inevitable evil" which sits on the deposits of energy fuels and supplies "Europe" with oil and gas' (Iskenderov 2012: 91). Western European civil society actors, in turn, view the energy inter-dependence as too strong to allow any serious and critical dialogue between the EU and Russia on human rights or other issues pertaining to the internal affairs of either Russia or the EU.[2]

The *Realpolitik* undercurrent in the EU-Russia relations reached its apex in August 2008, when Russia resorted to the use of military force to exercise power politics and to (re)assert its sphere of interest in the post-Soviet space. The war in Georgia was the ultimate showdown of Russia's *Realpolitik* on the outskirts of the EU, which affected not only the EU-Russia relations but also IR research: it prompted political demands for a 'complete paradigm shift in the security architecture of Europe' as called for by the Estonian President Toomas Ilves (quoted in Astrov 2011a: 1) and instigated a new wave of the English School approaches in the EU-Russia studies focusing on 'great power management' (Astrov 2011b: 158). The present conflict in Ukraine, Russia's operations in the Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine and consequent Western sanctions have further contributed to the political realist picture regarding the absolute gridlock of the EU-Russia relations.

The purpose of this article is not to refute the critical academic and political accounts outlined above. On the contrary, the aim here is to demonstrate that the conventional wisdom of *political realism* can be transcended and developed into *critical realism*, which allows us to realise new possibilities for the EU-Russia cooperation in the midst of seemingly unbridgeable obstacles. These possibilities emerge from nascent ruptures in the plate tectonics of *Realpolitik*, including the present renewal of the EU-Russia partnership agreement and Russia's recent accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In particular, this article will introduce and devise a novel critical realist method of studying the EU-Russia relations, namely the model of emancipatory windows.[3]

This article will demonstrate that the application of the critical realist model can produce practical suggestions for the development of cooperation frameworks between the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and Russia. New elements could be included in the successor to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Russia, which formally expired in 2007, and in the Third Common Space on external security. The negotiations on a new, legally binding partnership agreement have been underway since 2008, with over ten rounds of negotiations thus far. In particular, the article will propose the adoption and implementation of the UN-sponsored principle of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) in the aforementioned cooperation frameworks between the CSDP and Russia.

RtoP is a political principle agreed upon by the UN member states in 2005, which calls for individual states and regional and international organisations to protect populations from the four most egregious crimes, namely genocide, crimes against

humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.[4] The incorporation of RtoP in the cooperation structures of the EU and Russia could bring about 'emancipation' not only for populations targeted by RtoP crimes but also for political decision-makers of the EU and Russia by inspiring new forms of cooperation between the two parties. In this way, it could help them bridge the current — and politically embarrassing — mismatch between their official mantra, which portrays Russia and the EU as the closest strategic partners, and the conspicuous lack of convergence and concrete cooperation between the two 'partners'.

Analytical framework: devising the model of emancipatory windows in the EU-Russia Studies

The potentials of critical realist methodology in the EU-Russia studies are discussed by Haukkala (2010); however, thus fur, the methodology has not gained much attention from other scholars working in the field. Haukkala argues that the multi-causal ontology of critical realism holds promising potentials to open up a more comprehensive framework for explaining the EU-Russia relations than mono-causal approaches. The multi-causal method of critical realism aims to take into consideration all relevant ontological levels of analysis in studying the EU-Russia relations, including the normative layer (e.g., the PCA and the four roadmaps) and the level of practices, as opposed to the mono-causal method of discourse analysis, which restricts its ontological horizon to the ideational level of discourses. Thus, critical realism holds 'increased diagnostic and explanatory power' (Haukkala 2010: 172) compared with discourse analysis.

While this article agrees with Haukkala's account, it is also viewed here that the 'opening up' of ontology proposed in it has direct implications for emancipatory analysis, which is not discussed by Haukkala. Unlike in other critical IR approaches, emancipation in critical realism does not refer to any specific issue of world politics, political agenda or project, such as the promotion of human security in favour of state security or the liberation of human individuals from the 'tyrant's charter' (Booth 1995: 116) of oppressive Westphalian state sovereignty as in the Welsh School and critical security studies (e.g., Wyn Jones 1999). Instead, critical realists define 'emancipation' in more general terms, namely as the liberation of agents from 'unwanted states of affairs' (Bhaskar 1986: 169–71). In critical realism, then, emancipation is context-dependent; it is contingent upon a particular situation at hand as well as on the collective agent who is confronted by it. In the case in point here, the 'unwanted states of affairs' refer to a political deadlock and the lack of convergence in the EU-Russia relations, which both Russian and the EU leaders view as undesirable, as well as to the lack of effective joint action in global conflict management, as explained in the introduction. The capacity of critical realism to open up the ontological horizon of a research object not only enables a researcher to

produce more comprehensive and accurate *multi-causal* explanations thereof, but also permits him/her to discover and pinpoint previously unseen and unrealised emancipatory potentials on that horizon.

By choosing a *mono-causal* approach to study the EU-Russia relations, a researcher restricts his/her focus to a singular level of analysis or to a limited sector of these relations (ontological reductionism), which, in turn, make it hard for him/her to find new emancipatory possibilities to improve those relations (emancipatory reductionism). If we focused our attention on the ideational level of discourses, where differences between the EU and Russia are at the starkest, it would be easy to concur with Prozorov's pessimistic assessment: the best the EU and Russia could do is to adopt a mutual policy of delimitation, in which both parties refrain from making claims concerning each other's sovereign spheres (Prozorov 2006). Thus, the exploration of possibilities for emancipation from the current deadlock in the EU-Russia relations by means of mono-causal analysis would be as hard for a researcher as it is for a driver suffering from tunnel vision to find an exit in a multi-lane roundabout in traffic jam: one needs to have the capacity to *scan* the whole ontological horizon first in order to *spot* possible avenues of liberation on that horizon.

The aforementioned double move (scanning→spotting) underlies the critical realist model of emancipatory windows developed here, which suggests that it is necessary to scan the totality of all relevant constraints and possibilities of the EU-Russia relations first. Only then it is possible to spot a narrower sphere of cooperation within that totality, where emancipation might be possible through concrete practices. The critical realist model abandons a more radical approach, according to which emancipation could be comprehensive and achieved overnight by revolutionising the EU-Russia relations. Instead of a full-fledged revolution, the critical realist method may discover and locate narrower spheres — emancipatory windows — within the totality of the EU-Russia relations, in which ruptures of transformation are possible.

Discourse analysis may reduce ontology to the ideational level, where differences between the EU and Russia are prevalent. Such reductive ontology logically leads to a pessimistic assessment of emancipatory possibilities, coupled with a policy of delimitation.[5] Another example of the reduction of emancipatory windows is provided by political realism. In IR theory, political realism derives substantial, and often fallible, claims regarding state-systems from the universally selfish human nature (Carr 1946: 10; Morgenthau 1960: 4). This, in turn, may lead to the exaggeration of material constraints, such as the assumed 'selfishness' of the Russian or the EU political elite, which obstructs the EU-Russia relations by default. This is also portrayed as the shrinking of the emancipatory window in the figure below. Critical realism holds the potential to avoid ontological reductionism associated with political realism by allowing a particular case study to reveal its nature without hampering it with prior ontological assumptions (Bhaskar 1997; Bhaskar and Norrie 1998: 567).

Critical realism stresses that it is necessary to seek possibilities on the entire ontological horizon of a research object, including both normative factors (the Y-axis

in the figure below) and material factors (the X-axis). Here, the capacity of the holistic ontology of critical realism to uncover previously unseen emancipatory possibilities is encapsulated perfectly in the common proverb: 'seek and ye shall find'. At the same time, critical realism prevents emancipatory analysis from lapsing into an anti-realist ideational fallacy, which is portrayed as an 'enlarged window' below.[6]

The framework of the above model is based on the commonsensical distinction between material factors (the X-axis) and normative ones (the Y-axis). This dichotomy has been commonly applied in social science, including the EU-Russia studies (e.g., Haukkala 2010). The term 'material' used here does not signify the broader philosophical notion of 'material cause' (e.g., Jones 2002: 156; Kurki 2003: 9), which, in Aristotelian terms, would mean any kind of 'primary being' that pre-exists social activity. Instead, it refers to what Bhaskar's critical realist account describes as the 'material plane of transactions' (Bhaskar 1986: 130) between the subject and his/her physical environment.

In this article, 'the material plane of transactions' refers concretely to geopolitics, particularly the tendency of Russia to portray its immediate regional surrounding, that is, the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as its main sphere of influence. The purpose here is not to provide an exhaustive account of all the motivations and causes that affect Russia's and the EU's geopolitical strategies. Rather, this article will concentrate on those aspects of geopolitics that are relevant to emancipatory analysis: it will analyse geopolitics as one crucial set of material factors that delineate the 'boundaries of possible' for the CSDP-Russia cooperation and its further development.

While the distinction between normative and material factors mainly serves analytical purposes here, the term 'possibilities' has a more substantive meaning. Possibilities can be both material and normative in nature, as portrayed in Figure 1. Harré and Madden's (1998: 114) critical realist account provides a more detailed definition of the term:

> 'Possibility' we define by reference to the range of states, truth-values etc. expressed in the consequent clauses of the conditionals, assertoric or counter-factual, true of some system of particulars, in virtue of the natures of those particulars. Thus, from the chemical nature of dynamite we infer 'If detonated it will explode.' Exploding then, is a possibility for dynamite.

With the help of the critical realist conception outlined above, the meaning of the term 'possibilities' could be specified for the purposes of this article. 'Possibilities' thus refer concretely to those new modes of cooperation between the EU and Russia in the Third Common Space which could emerge *if* certain unexplored or underused parts of the overall system of the EU-Russia relations ('system of particulars'), for example, multilateralism ('underused particular') and RtoP ('unused particular'), were actualised and put into use. The key word 'if' applied here signifies the 'consequent clauses of the conditionals' mentioned by Harré and Madden. An increased

Figure 1 Model of emancipatory windows.

and evolved cooperation between the EU and Russia, then, is a possibility for multilateralism and RtoP.

Possibilities are integrally related to emancipation, since the increase and development of cooperation would simultaneously help the EU and Russian political leaders to break free from the current political deadlock in their relations. 'Constraints', in turn, constitute counter-mechanisms that work against the actualisation and realisation of possibilities and simultaneously hinder emancipation, as described by Bhaskar (1998a: 670):

[J]ust as the concept of *constraint* must be *negatively generalized* to include unwanted and unnecessary, and so remediable, ills qua absences and hence that to

constrain such a constraint is to liberate, the concept of *freedom* must be *positively generalized* (and substantialized) so as to encompass not just such obvious items as rights, equities and (participation-in-)democracies, but needs and possibilities, such as possibilities for self-development and self-realization.

According to critical realism, practices form an integral part of emancipation (Bhaskar 1986: 169–71). One salient feature of practices, which also explains their explanatory powers and appeal as an ontological tool in IR research, is their capacity to weave together time (the Z-axis), the material world (the X-axis), and the normative world (the Y-axis). As Adler and Pouliot argue, 'Practices are competent performances […], practices have no existence other than in their unfolding or process. The performance of practice goes with, and constitutes, the flow of history [the Z-axis] […]. Finally, practice weaves together the *discursive and material* worlds [the X-Y-axes]' (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 6–8; emphasis added). This article will demonstrate that there are several practices (portrayed along the Z-axis), notably joint action in peacekeeping and RtoP operations, which could be realised in the CSDP-Russia relations, considering the existing material and normative possibilities and constraints (the X-Y-axes).

The analysis of the CSDP-Russia cooperation in the following sections will be organised in accordance with the three variables presented above. The first part will focus on the Y-axis by exploring the existing normative constraints (Section 'normative constraints of cooperation: shallowness of the institutional foundation of the CSDP-Russia relations') and normative possibilities (Section 'Normative possibilities of cooperation: multilateralism and international rule of law') of cooperation in the contemporary CSDP-Russia relations. The second part will complete the framework of emancipatory windows by adding the X-axis, which entails material constraints (Section 'Material constraints of cooperation: clash of geopolitical interests') and material possibilities (Section 'Material possibilities of cooperation: Nascent forms of joint operations in global peacekeeping and crisis management') in the CSDP-Russia cooperation. The final part of the article (Section 'Future projections of RtoP in the CSDP-Russia relations' and Section 'Future projections of joint peacekeeping practices in the CSDP-Russia relations') will proceed to examine the Z-axis, which entails projections of possible material and normative practices of the future CSDP-Russia cooperation. These projections of *what might be* (the Z-axis) will be based on the previous analysis of *what is possible* (the X-Y-axes).

In the end, the model can produce a practice-oriented and rhythmically evolving,[7] rather than static, picture of the EU-Russia relations. This kind of emancipatory research could be described as a 'narrow but deep' approach. The term 'narrow' here refers to the realist worldview (the latter part of critical *realism*), which takes into consideration the prevailing constraints of cooperation, that is, the narrowness of the emancipatory window and concrete practices embedded in it. The term 'deep' refers to the critical worldview (the first part of *critical* realism), which sheds light on

different ways in which envisaged practices of cooperation could be developed and deepened in the future.

To elaborate further the tri-variable model with the help of the functionalist IR theory, the X-Y-Z-axes also hang together through an inverse, functionalist logic: the enhancement of practical cooperation in the future (the continuation and qualitative evolution of practices along the Z-axis) might increase the overall structural possibilities for the EU-Russia cooperation in other sectors in the long run (the incremental and quantitative expansion of the emancipatory window along the X-Y-axes), as portrayed in Figure 2. Functionalist IR theorists argue that practical cooperation tends to 'spill over' incrementally from a limited set of functions to a wider spectrum, for example to new thematic and geopolitical sectors (Mitrany 1975). In Europe, for instance, political integration between nation-states has expanded incrementally from a limited sector of coal and steel cooperation to a wider spectrum of economic functions, and eventually to defence and security policy sectors.

In the current relation between the EU and Russia, the functionalist logic of 'form follows function' has been invoked in connection to educational exchange programmes and student mobility between Russian and Western European universities, for instance. The expansion of these programmes would enhance solidarity — or at least reduce adversarial images — between the EU and Russian citizens at the grass-root level in the long run. This, in turn, would encourage further cooperation between the EU and Russia in other sectors. In precisely the same way, launching concrete new practices in the Third Common Space on external security, for example in the framework of RtoP, would *per se* create possibilities for further and wider cooperation between the EU and Russia in the future.


Figure 2 Tri-unity of materiality, normativity and time: functionalist spill-over of the CSDP-Russia cooperation.

Normative constraints of cooperation: shallowness of the institutional foundation of the CSDP-Russia relations

In multilateral diplomacy, Russia has traditionally laid emphasis on Westphalian sovereignty, which entails the principles of territorial integrity, non-interference and non-intervention in inter-state affairs (Krasner 1999: 20; Gowan and Brantner 2008: 3). That focus has been coupled with Russia's critique of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. In his public statements issued immediately after taking office in early 2000, President Vladimir Putin strongly opposed the right to humanitarian intervention (e.g., Sakwa 2003: 183). Putin's resistance was consequently echoed by the whole foreign policy apparatus of Russia, as evidenced by the new Military Doctrine approved by the Presidential Decree on 21 April, 2000. It chastened the advocates of humanitarian intervention and stated Russia's concern over the use of coercive military force as a means of 'humanitarian intervention' without the sanction of the UN Security Council, regardless of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law (Sakwa 2003: 183).

In the new Military Doctrine, approved on 5 February, 2010, Russia's critique of interventionism in international relations persists, but its crux is directed at NATO's global expansionism, which is viewed as one of the principal external dangers to Russia. The doctrine opposes efforts to enable NATO carry out 'global functions […] in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc' (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2010).

Compared with Russia's foreign and security policy, which stresses Westphalian sovereignty and non-intervention, the EU and European countries pursue a more interventionist human rights policy (Wheeler 2004: 48). This fundamental difference partly explains the failure of Russia and the EU to converge on issues related to external security and the shallowness of the normative foundation upon which the institutionalised CSDP-Russia cooperation is based. The cornerstone of that foundation is the PCA, complemented by the more recently established four Common Spaces. While the PCA regulates the EU-Russia affairs in the long term, the roadmaps for the implementation of the Common Spaces function as middle-to-short-term instruments.

The PCA came into force on 1 December, 1997, for an initial duration of ten years, constituting the 'post-sovereign core of the EU-Russia relations' (Haukkala 2010: 83). In 2008, the EU and Russia launched the negotiation process for a renewed contractual arrangement. It is expected to be more substantive in terms of cooperation in international peace and security and in global conflict management compared with the old PCA, which concentrates on trade and economic relations without any provisions on external security, except for political dialogue mentioned in Article 6 and shared values. The new contract will most probably fill that vacuum by referring

to the Third Common Space on external security, although the extent and depth of that reference — or the fate of the whole post-PCA process, for that matter — remain uncertain.

The creation of the four Common Spaces, including the third one regarding external security, was agreed upon at the EU-Russia Summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003. They were consequently adopted at the Moscow Summit in May 2005. One of the five sections outlined in the roadmap for the Third Common Space concerns conflict management and the ESDP (now CSDP). The whole roadmap has been subject to criticism not only due to the lack of progress in its implementation, but also because of the shallowness of shared values enshrined in it.[8]

Averre, for example, observes that, 'While [the initial section of the roadmap] introduces the EU's emphasis on values, it differs notably from the convergence logic of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) — rejected by Moscow in favour of the common spaces format — which refers to "a ring of countries, *sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives*"' (Averre 2006: 125). Averre also identifies other deficiencies in the roadmap, including conceptual confusion, lack of a genuine common vision, differing priorities of the EU and Russia with regard to the roadmap, and its prioritisation of strategic partnership over shared values. In light of these weaknesses, the description 'roadmap' actually appears somewhat misleading. The document resembles a shopping list of sorts, which registers the EU's and Russia's different strategic objectives, rather than a shared vision or guide to a common goal, which would pull together and merge these divergent objectives into a cohesive whole.

Normative possibilities of cooperation: multilateralism and international rule of law

Russia's fierce opposition to the doctrine of humanitarian intervention presents an obstacle to increasing and developing the EU-Russia collaboration in the Third Common Space, as explained in the previous section. Upon a closer examination, however, it turns out that Russia's stated opposition is actually restricted to those instances in which military force is used outside the collective security system of the UN and against internationally accepted norms and principles of international law. The 2000 Military Doctrine, for example, opposes the 'utilization of military-force actions as a means of "humanitarian intervention" without the sanction of the UN Security Council, *in circumvention of the generally accepted principles and norms of international law*' (IGCC 2000; emphasis added).

What is notable in Russia's official position outlined above is that its opposition does not apply to RtoP, since RtoP belongs to the set of 'generally accepted principles' in international relations. The official definition of RtoP outlined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome is in conformity with the provisions of the UN

Charter, a legally binding convention of international law. Moreover, RtoP reaffirms the principle of multilateralism, the primacy of the UN collective security system, and the supreme authority of the UN Security Council in launching international military interventions — which are all emphasised in Russia's foreign policy. Edward Luck, the UN Special Adviser for RtoP at the time, explained to the author how the official definition of RtoP, which underlies the UN implementation report on RtoP published in 2009, differs crucially from the report of ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) published in 2001, which entails certain aspects of humanitarian intervention:

> The Secretary-General's report [on RtoP] is not related in any particular way to the ICISS report, but to the [UN] Charter and to the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. The ICISS talks about seeking *subsequent* authority from the Security Council, but that is contrary to the Charter, because Article 53(1) [of the Charter] makes very clear that enforcement action by regional arrangements is to be based on presumably the *previous* authorisation by the Security Council. The Secretary-General cannot have a report arguing something that is contrary to the Charter.[9]

Thus, the official definition of RtoP, unlike the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, does not allow individual countries or regional organisations, including NATO, to undertake unilateral military actions without seeking prior authorisation from the UN Security Council. For Russia, this distinction is important, bearing in mind its fierce critique of the unilateral NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

It is possible to discover normative possibilities or 'building blocks' for a deeper cooperation between the EU and Russia also in the existing normative foundation of the CSDP-Russia relations, including the roadmap for the Third Common Space, despite its distinct flaws and other constraints identified in the previous section. The first building block, namely multilateralism, is outlined at the very beginning of the roadmap for the Third Common Space:

> The EU and Russia share responsibility for an international order based on effective multilateralism. They will therefore co-operate to strengthen *the central role of the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and act effectively*, and promote the role and effectiveness of relevant […] regimes and treaties, which make an important contribution to a more just and secure world.[10]

The aforementioned provision places multilateralism at the heart of the CSDP-Russia relations with a view to promoting international peace and security, although it does not specify concrete initiatives and means by which such multilateral cooperation should be implemented. The provision, including its referral to the 'responsibilities' of the UN in particular, constitutes the value base for multilateral cooperation. Upon that base, new joint initiatives of the CSDP-Russia cooperation, such as those relating to RtoP, could be established, considering the fact that multilateralism is also emphasised in the official definition of RtoP.

In Russian foreign policy, multilateralism has stemmed from various political, ideological, social and economic roots since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rather confrontational and antagonistic Primakov doctrine of 1997 was formed along the lines of the 1815 Concert of Europe model, and it portrayed the global domination of the US as a major threat to Russia. In Putin's era, Russian foreign policy has shifted from this binary worldview to a more complex and nuanced vision presented in the 'multi-vector model', in which threats are considered as multi-faceted, emanating from multiple sources, such as terrorism and extremism (e.g., Fedorov 2005: 17).[11] Russia's foreign, security and defence policies are still aimed at retaining the great power status in world affairs, perhaps more than ever since the end of the Cold War, but they have also been adjusted to meet the challenges and opportunities of multilateral institutions in global politics (De Haas 2010).

In many instances, the 'multi-vector model' has been applied more as a convenient tool, or a 'safety valve' to ease tensions in world politics, than as a consistent doctrine. The rhetoric of multilateralism has also frequently served as a fig leaf concealing the pursuit of Russia's national interests. In 2006, for example, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (2006: 69) stated:

> I cannot agree with the idea that there is the possibility of an imminent conflict between the European and Asian vectors of Russian diplomacy [...]. Multifaceted orientation is one of its key characteristics outlined in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, endorsed by the president in June 2000.

This statement can be interpreted as a tactical move to counterbalance Putin's claim earlier that same year, when he argued that Asia could be considered as an alternative energy market to Europe. Putin's assertion caused unrest among the EU decision-makers regarding Europe's energy security, quite understandably, as over a fourth of all oil and gas consumed in the EU was imported from Russia. Consequently, Putin reversed his controversial statement at the EU-Russia Summit in Sochi on 25 May, 2006, to appease Russia's European partners. These twists and turns in Russian foreign policy demonstrate a quite flexible and opportunistic way in which Russia applies its multi-vector model.

Nevertheless, the shifting *strategic* calculations underlying Russia's multilateral policy described above do not reduce the normative value of multilateralism as such, upon which new initiatives of the CSDP-Russia cooperation, including RtoP, could be based. In IR theory, the English School solidarists point out that mixed or 'impure' motives underlying interventions aimed at the protection of civilians do not neces-sarily render them illegitimate. Hence, the reasons for launching military interven-tions do not have to be purely humanitarian but may also be related to national and strategic interests. Solidarists argue that the majority of the cases of military inter-ventions undertaken for humanitarian purposes actually involve mixed motivations, which combine both humanitarian objectives and self-interest (Wheeler and Morris 1996: 138). From the perspective of this solidarist logic, it would be perfectly

legitimate to develop and implement new multilateral institutions such as RtoP in the CSDP-Russia relations, despite the fact that the underlying motivations of both the EU and Russia for adopting such frameworks would be partly or mainly 'selfish' or 'opportunistic'.

The normative basis of shared values underlying the EU-Russia cooperation in the field of external security encompasses not only multilateralism but also democracy and fundamental human rights. In this regard, the roadmap for the Third Common Space makes a special reference to the PCA and OSCE: 'The EU and Russia share common values, as defined in the Helsinki Final Act as well as in the PCA and other relevant international documents notably respect for international law, including respect for democratic principles and human rights [...]'.[12] The corresponding paragraph in the PCA can be found in Article 2: 'Respect for democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, underpins the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitutes an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement'.[13] Thus, the intention to uphold the right to life and other fundamental human rights lies, at least in principle, at the heart of the CSDP-Russia relations. That normative commitment to respect human rights, in addition to multilateralism, ties the normative foundation of the CSDP-Russia relations to RtoP.

Material constraints of cooperation: clash of geopolitical interests

When geopolitics is taken into account in analysing the CSDP-Russia relations, it turns out that the roadmap for the Third Common Space contains elements which, paradoxically, prevent the full potential of those relations from coming to fruition. The most severe impediment, which effectively holds back the CSDP-Russia cooperation in global conflict management, lies in the fourth section of the roadmap entitled 'Cooperation in Crisis Management'. The aim of that section is to 'strengthen EU-Russia dialogue on matters of practical cooperation on crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives, including [...] the settlement of regional conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russia borders'. The common neighbourhood of the EU and Russia mentioned in this section includes the situations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which have previously been termed as 'frozen conflicts'.

With a view to the geographical proximity of these perennial conflicts in the CIS region to the EU and to Russia, both parties share a *longue durée* geopolitical interest to prevent them from deepening and escalating. However, in the short- to mid-term perspective the possibilities for joint CSDP-Russia initiatives to tackle these conflicts seem remote for two reasons. Firstly, some recent developments, notably the conflict in Ukraine and the war in Georgia in 2008, cast a long shadow of doubt over the EU-Russia cooperation, which effectively impedes the potential for

the CSDP-Russia cooperation in the common neighbourhood. Secondly, and most importantly, Russia continues to resist any attempt on the part of Western powers to gain influence in the area of the CIS, be it NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) or the EU accession process.

In Russia's geopolitical thinking, the CIS region has a special status within Russia's sphere of influence. It is portrayed as the 'backyard' of Russia, which complicates any constructive joint initiative between the EU and Russia in the area. As Neil MacFarlane explains, since 1992 the Russian political elite have considered that they enjoy a *droit de regard* in this area. Undoubtedly, that sentiment is partly inspired by a post-Soviet nostalgia, but it is also based on a longer-term vision of Eurasia derived from Russian nationalist thinking (MacFarlane 2003: 130). This ideology has been coupled with strategic considerations, notably the geopolitical portrayal of the CIS region as a buffer zone insulating Russia from the influence and potential spread of Islamist extremism from countries like Afghanistan. Another significant material impediment lies in the prospect of a new Great Game in Central Asia, that is, a competition between Russia, the US, Turkey, and Japan for its vast resources, notably oil and natural gas (e.g., Rubinstein 2003: 93).

Russia's suspicions about Western 'intrusions' in the CIS area have considerably reduced its willingness to sponsor peace processes in that region. It is, in fact, widely viewed among the Russian political elite that Russia's interests are best served by maintaining controlled instability in the CIS region. The latter, rather draconian, strategy is implemented by maintaining the *status quo* of the perennial conflicts in the CIS region and their isolation. From Russia's perspective, the possible resolution of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is expected to generate not only desired results, such as increased stability next to the Russian border. It would also lead to the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border and the consequent shift of the Armenian foreign policy towards deeper integration in the EU, which, in turn, would diminish Russia's sphere of influence.

The EU, for its part, has been somewhat hesitant to engage in any peacekeeping action in the CIS area, calculating that it could be (mis)interpreted by Russia as an expansionist and antagonistic move to spread the Western influence. Therefore, the EU has 'more often than not stepped back from acting in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh' (Kobzova *et al.* 2011: 86). For example, the EU's failure to launch a follow-on operational mission on the Georgia-Russia border to replace the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) terminated in early 2005 was mainly a result of the EU's indecision. It was, in fact, part of the EU's overall failure to establish a full-fledged CSDP mission in the area (ICG 2006: 24–25). The European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia was deployed only after the Georgia war on 1 October, 2008.

In addition to the CIS region, another area where security cooperation between Russia and the West, including the EU, has been gridlocked is the Middle East, as evidenced by the persistent paralysis of the UN Security Council in managing the

ongoing civil war in Syria. Russia's fierce resistance against coercive interventions in Syria stems mainly from its strategic, material and geopolitical considerations. The regime of Bashar Al-Assad has been an important customer and ally for Russia in the region. The arms transfer agreements between Russia and Syria rose from approximately 2 billion US dollars in 2003–2006 to almost 5 billion in 2007–2010, although the total sum of the actualised transfers was lower and their relative importance within Russia's overall portfolio of global arms trade was limited (Menkiszak 2013: 6).

In general, Russia views Syria as its forefront separating it from the West and attempts to block all attempts of Western governments to influence the Syrian civil war, including their support to rebel groups, which are viewed in Russia as an unwelcome expansion of the Western sphere of influence. Some researchers point out that another major obstacle for cooperation between Russia and the West in Syria has been the obstinate belief among conservative-minded decision-makers in Russia that the whole Arab spring was a result of Western conspiracy: 'They drew clear parallels between the "colour revolutions" with overthrown governments in Yugoslavia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), and the Arab Spring as carried out by activists trained with the use of American manuals' (Menkiszak 2013: 7).

The parallel made between the CIS region and the Middle East has been used as a means of political rhetoric and manipulation, as explained above, but it is illuminating in terms of the subject matter of this article: at present, both regions seem to entail overwhelming *material obstacles* which stand in the way of deeper security cooperation between the West, including the EU, and Russia. These impediments do not relate to RtoP as such, but to collective security in general: not only RtoP but the *whole* collective security system of the UN, including the Security Council, has been paralysed in the CIS region and in the Middle East.

Material possibilities of cooperation: nascent forms of joint operations in global peacekeeping and crisis management

Given the material constraints outlined in the previous section, it seems bizarre that the roadmap for the Third Common Space, which is designed to function as a mid-term political instrument in coordinating the EU-Russia affairs, puts a special emphasis on the resolution of the perennial conflicts in the politically sensitive CIS region of the common neighbourhood at the expense of conflict resolution in those geographical areas where initiating cooperation would be more realistic and successful, particularly Africa. The prospects of Africa for the CSDP-Russia cooperation are accentuated by the fact that neither the EU nor Russia have *vital* national interests at stake on that continent.

The EU and Russia have already conducted a few joint operations in global crisis management. Russia took part in the EU police mission in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (2003–2006). In January 2008, Russia decided to send a Russian Aviation Group (RAG) to the EU mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR). In total, Russia contributed 120 military personnel and four MI-8 transport helicopters to EUFOR Chad/CAR in early 2009. Two other operations, in which Russia has cooperated with the EU thus far (albeit with lesser contributions), have been the EU maritime operation Atlanta in December 2008 and Russia's naval cooperation with the EU in the Gulf of Aden. Apart from these precedents, the CSDP-Russia cooperation has been low in numbers and in importance. Their cooperation has been limited mainly to technical consultations and staff exercises between senior officers, for example contacts between Russian officials with the European Defence Agency and the European Defence College.

The regular political dialogue between the EU and Russia might eventually generate joint initiatives in tackling perennial conflicts in the CIS region, and there is some evidence pointing in that direction. In a memorandum signed on 5 June, 2010, German Chancellor Merkel and Russian President Medvedev cited Transnistria as a possible first test case for 'cooperation' and even a 'joint EU-Russia engagement' (Inayeh 2010: n.p.). At present, however, the prospects for joint engagement in Transnistria and other conflicts in the CIS region seem unrealistic because of the four prevailing material constraints identified in the previous section.

Concretely, the integration of RtoP in the CSDP-Russia cooperation would mean an increased focus on military and civilian crisis management in Africa for two reasons. Firstly, the four crimes outlined in RtoP — genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing — are most frequent on the African continent. Secondly, Africa is a more viable and realistic target for the CSDP-Russia operations than the CIS area, where political tensions and disagreements between the two strategic partners associated with the perennial conflicts in the CIS region currently hamper effective cooperation between them. Africa is the place where the normative and strategic trajectories of the EU and Russia could intersect and converge.

The EU's own engagements in Africa have already generated tangible results. The EU's Artemis operation, for example, enabled the return of 50,000 refugees in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Moreover, Artemis had symbolic value: it emitted a positive and encouraging signal to other potential troop-contributing countries to join peacekeeping efforts in the area. In global conflict management, international and regional organisations deployed in any given conflict zone typically complement each other. Evans, for example, notes with regard to conflict management in Darfur that, 'Australia has offered forces but only if "there's action by the Europeans"' (Evans 2004). Such complementarity also applies to the relationship between the EU and Russia: the more action the EU can generate in global crisis management, the more possibilities and incentives Russia has to contribute to such efforts.

Future projections of RtoP in the CSDP-Russia relations

The argumentation of this article will now proceed to the final phase of emancipatory analysis, in which potential new practices of the CSDP-Russia cooperation will be mapped out along the Z-axis of the model of emancipatory windows portraying the timeline. Some recent developments in the EU-Russia relations are opening up emancipatory windows within which new cooperation practices could be realised in the future. Today, the EU-Russia relations are witnessing the first shimmering light of optimism, and the source of this optimism is the conclusion of negotiations on Russia's WTO membership in November 2011 and Russia's entry into the WTO the following month. Russia's membership in the WTO has been a precondition for the completion of negotiations on another agreement which is central to the analysis here, namely the successor to the PCA.

It will be argued below that the opening of the emancipatory windows would also allow RtoP to be added to the roadmap for the Third Common Space and to the new agreement between the EU and Russia succeeding the PCA. RtoP could be added to the roadmap on external security using, for instance, the following formulation:

> The parties will explore modalities of cooperation to protect civilians in armed conflicts, as part of political dialogue and joint initiatives in crisis management outlined in this roadmap, in conformity with international law and the principle of responsibility to protect, as enshrined in the UN World Summit Outcome of 2005.

In the new EU-Russia agreement, a similar reference could be made in more general terms, considering that the purpose of that instrument is to define the scope, not a deeper substance, of the EU-Russia cooperation and to delineate its general principles, objectives and underlying values in the long term. The post-PCA agreement is likely to refer to the already existing five sections of the roadmap on external security, that is, political dialogue, conflict management, non-proliferation, civilian rescue and fight against terrorism. In order to expand the scope of the Third Common Space, the new EU-Russia agreement could also include a sixth sector entitled 'protection of civilians and responsibility to protect'. Alternatively, such an addition could be incorporated in the section on conflict management. The latter option might actually be more realistic and acceptable to the parties, since both the EU and Russia are likely to be reluctant to re-open the painstaking negotiation process on the five sectors of the Third Common Space agreed upon in 2005.

Furthermore, both the roadmap and the post-PCA agreement should make a clearer distinction between the ongoing *regional dialogue* regarding the common neighbourhood and possible joint *global initiatives* for crisis management. As discussed earlier in this article, the present roadmap confuses these two separate categories of cooperation by including paragraphs regarding the exchange of views on the common neighbourhood in the section on (global) crisis management. Therefore, the EU-Russia dialogue on possible cooperation in global peacekeeping becomes

imbued and prejudiced by sensitive political topics such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Making a distinct separation between political dialogue on global conflict management, on the one hand, and political dialogue on the common neighbourhood, on the other, would enable the CSDP-Russia interaction to move towards a more practical and constructive direction in the field of global peacekeeping and to shift its geopolitical focus from the common neighbourhood to areas like Africa as potential targets of joint action.

RtoP could also be incorporated in the envisaged ministerial-level EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Policy (ERPSC), which, however, remains unrealised — perhaps indefinitely. The ERPSC was formulated on 5 June, 2010. According to the memorandum signed by German Chancellor Merkel and the then Russian President Medvedev, the ERPSC would 'establish ground rules for joint EU-Russia civil/military crisis management operations'.[14] RtoP could constitute one, albeit not exclusive, ground rule for joint EU-Russia actions in global conflict management also in the framework of the ERPSC, if that mechanism were put into practice in the future. At the moment, the development of the ERPSC has been stalled. As Vladimir Chizhov, Russia's Ambassador in the EU, explains the reasons for the current political deadlock on the initiative, '[T]he EU side linked the implementation of that idea [ERPSC] — in my opinion, without good reason — to progress along the Transnistrian settlement track, and then our partners shelved it' (Chizhov 2012: 31). Again, this demonstrates the way in which the fixation of the EU-Russia dialogue in the Third Common Space in the CIS area creates substantial impediment to the deeper institutionalisation of the EU-Russia relations, as concluded in the Section 'Material constraints of cooperation: clash of geopolitical interests'.

The above proposals, however, immediately raise the question of whether or not the EU and Russia would be ready and willing to add RtoP to their normative framework of cooperation. With regard to the EU, the answer to that question would obviously be 'yes'. The EU has traditionally held a more positive viewpoint on RtoP than Russia, as evidenced by the fact that the key documents of the CSDP, such as the Headline Goal 2010, refer to RtoP.[15]

The question remains as to whether or not Russia would ever accept the introduction of RtoP to the normative basis of the EU-Russia cooperation. It will be argued below that there are two types of factors which would enable such incorporation: the qualities of the RtoP principle and Russia's own interests. As for the former category, RtoP represents a *UN*-sanctioned norm approved at the UN World Summit of 2005, rather than an *EU* norm. Over 180 UN member states confirmed the official definition of RtoP in the general debate of the UN General Assembly on RtoP organised in 2009 (GCR2P 2009: 1). On account of the universal acceptance of RtoP in the UN membership, Russia's usual reticence against liberal Western norms does not apply to RtoP (e.g., Gatilov 2012: 9). In fact, in its official statements, Russia has repeatedly emphasised the importance of UN-sanctioned

norms in the international normative architecture, and RtoP represents one of those norms.

As for factors pertaining to Russia's foreign policy, Russia's tough stance on humanitarian intervention should not automatically be (mis)understood as an attempt to *undermine* the rules and institutions of international society, or as the spiralling of Russia deeper into the isolationist position in international society. Russia has, in fact, been active in strengthening the institutions of international society, only of a different kind from those envisaged in the solidarist English School theory. While solidarists consider humanitarian intervention as a basic institution of international society, which needs to be actualised occasionally, Russia emphasises the pluralist set of institutions, particularly sovereignty and non-intervention (e.g., Bull 1977).

As Aalto points out, 'the form of international society implied by the list of primary and secondary institutions pivotal to Russian foreign policy is towards the pluralist end of the spectrum' (Aalto 2007: 463). However, Aalto goes on to argue that, 'some practices within the EU-Russian strategic partnership indicate that Russia is moving towards a thicker conception of international society by experimenting with solidarist ideas' (ibid., 471). Such practices relate particularly to economic cooperation between the EU and Russia, and, to a lesser extent, to their external security (ibid.). In the future, these practices might also entail RtoP, which could constitute a continuum to the solidarist spectrum of EU-Russia relations.

Even the pluralist features of Russian foreign policy are not absolute, as evidenced by three factors. Firstly, a crucial distinction ought to be made between Russia's *longue durée* foreign policy, on the one hand, and its short-term strategic and opportunistic moves aimed at reaping benefits from political events, on the other. For example, the accentuated anti-interventionist tone of the Russian Military Doctrine of 2000 indicated less Russia's long-term policy than its hardened position on NATO's interventionism at the time, particularly on the Operation Allied Force launched in March 1999, which involved aerial bombings of Russia's ally, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, by the Western alliance. In the revised Military Doctrine of 2010, 'humanitarian intervention' is not even mentioned, as the geopolitical flashpoints of great power struggles had changed. At that time, the culmination point of political wrangling between the West and Russia was no longer the ethnic conflict in South Eastern Europe, but NATO's plan to place missile defence systems in Eastern Europe.

Russia's fiercest critique provoked by the cases of Kosovo and Iraq had settled down by 2005, when Foreign Minister Lavrov presented an article in the journal *Russia in Global Politics*, which had a markedly calmer tone. Lavrov's account distances itself from the categorical objection to humanitarian intervention in the 2000 Military Doctrine. Although the article as such does not represent the official Russian position, it reflects a slightly changed attitude and thinking of the Russian political elite. It not only recognises the transformation of the international normative architecture with regard to military intervention, but also *accepts* the emerging norm

in international society which legitimates *collective* interventions for humanitarian purposes, without labelling them as outright attempts of the Western powers to expand their sphere of influence:

> Heated debates are under way on an issue that is closely connected with 'humanitarian interventions' […]. The search for the right legal solution may take much effort; however, the creation of new international laws, be it through Security Council resolutions or universal instruments, must proceed on the basis of a strict observance of generally accepted international norms while these remain in effect. (Lavrov 2005: 153)

Lavrov's article draws attention to the need for case-specific consideration and better-defined criteria for the use of coercive measures in humanitarian intervention: 'There can be no universal recipe or simple arithmetic solutions, such as "99 people killed are not quite genocide, but 100 people killed are, so the Security Council must automatically make a respective decision"' (ibid., 150). Surely, Lavrov's argument does not mark a shift in Russian foreign policy towards the so-called solidarist view-point, which places emphasis on the universal requirement to protect civilians threatened by genocidal governments. However, it does acknowledge the importance of RtoP authorised by the UN Security Council. According to Russia's standpoint, which is also reflected in Lavrov's article, the implementation of RtoP should be based on political and case-specific discretion, rather than on a mechanical logic. This viewpoint is, in fact, perfectly logical and legitimate also from the EU's viewpoint: it is commonly viewed that RtoP should not be portrayed as a kind of legal automation, but rather as a political principle.

The second factor which demonstrates that Russia's anti-interventionist stance is not as categorical as it is widely assumed resides in its instrumental use of foreign policy language. The public statements of Russian officials should not always be considered as reliable and definite evidence of Russia's political tendencies, for they also often serve as opportunistic or 'convenient' rhetorical tools.[16] The term 'Potemkinisation' of Russian foreign policy refers to the tradition of official myth-making dating back to the time of Catherine the Great. 'In the post-Soviet era', as Lo explains, 'policy documents such as the Foreign Policy and National Security Concepts have been important less as a meaningful guide to action or as a conceptual framework than as an indicator of political fashion and a mechanism designed to reconcile — at least in public — sharp contradictions among competing sectoral interests' (Lo 2003: 13). The persistence of such official myth-making in Russian foreign policy is enabled by its closed circles of decision-making, which have prevailed in Russia, despite incremental improvements in the political transparency of its state apparatus.

Thirdly, Russia's anti-interventionist rhetoric has diminished to some extent as a result of the reduction of fighting and violence in Chechnya. As MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss point out, Russia's tendency to emphasise the rule of non-intervention has

partly derived from a possibility, or rather, a *perceived* possibility that Russia itself could become a target of humanitarian intervention by international society in Chechnya because of the lack of human security and the violation of human rights in the area (MacFarlane *et al.* 2004: 982). That possibility is currently subsiding, thanks to the gradual improvement of the security situation in Chechnya.

Future projections of joint peacekeeping practices in the CSDP-Russia relations

Section 'Material possibilities of cooperation: nascent forms of joint operations in globalpeacekeeping and crisis management' has shown that it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel in order to develop the CSDP-Russia cooperation. The old forms of cooperation, which have already proven successful, could be replicated in new thematic and geographical areas. For example, the Russian heavy airlift capacities, which have already demonstrated their usefulness in the EU military operations, could be utilised also in civilian crisis management, for example in transporting the EU Civilian Response Teams to conflict zones. In more general terms, the best practices and lessons learned in the military sector could be further modified and replicated in the civilian sector. That kind of functionalist spill-over of cooperation could also take place between civilian sectors. For example, aviation groups of Russia's Emergency Situations and Civil Defense Ministry have cooperated with relevant EU units in fighting fires in European countries (Chizhov 2012: 31), and lessons learned from these joint operations could provide templates for similar practices in other sectors, including civilian crisis management.

Particularly civilian crisis management and the conception of comprehensive security outlined in RtoP could constitute a viable basis for joint action between Russia and the EU in the field of external security. Comprehensive crisis management constitutes the substantive 'beef' of RtoP: the current debates on RtoP have engendered a consensus that the responsibility of international society to protect civilians threatened by genocidal regimes entails not only responsibility to react to massive human rights violations, but also responsibility to rebuild societies and the rule of law in order to repair the damages inflicted upon them by intervention forces, and responsibility to prevent the recurrence of violence (e.g., ICISS 2001: xi; Roberts 2004: 94–95). In short, RtoP promotes comprehensive human security in all phases of conflict by all available means, which underlines the importance of civilian crisis management in the implementation of RtoP.

Tutu's assessment of RtoP reflects the focus on comprehensive human security 'programmed' in RtoP: 'The Responsibility to Protect is frequently misunderstood. It is not a justification of military intervention […]. The place to start is with prevention: through measures aimed in particular at building state capacity, remedying grievances, and ensuring the rule of law' (Tutu 2008: 6). Tutu's analysis of RtoP

seems particularly apposite to potential cooperation between the CSDP and Russia on RtoP: chances to develop that cooperation are more realistic in politically less sensitive sectors of RtoP, such as conflict prevention, the rule of law and civilian crisis management, than in the sector of military crisis management.

However, the technical proposals for joint action in civilian crisis management outlined above would require political will to be materialised. Of all EU countries, France stands the best chances to persuade Russia to increase its participation in the EU missions, not least because of its activity in strengthening the CSDP and in developing its external relations. France has played the role of a primus motor in initiating the CSDP-Russia cooperation in the past. The bilateral dialogue between the EU and Russia in the areas of external security and crisis management was proposed for the first time during the French EU Presidency, namely at the EU-Russia Summit in Paris in October 2000. In 2008, when France held the EU Presidency the next time, it defined the Third Common Space as one of the areas to be developed in the EU-Russia relations. Moreover, France's active role in conflict management in Central Africa would be an important incentive to develop the CSDP-Russia cooperation particularly in that geographical area.

Conclusion

The *critical* realist model proposed here challenges the face-value *political* realist hypothesis on the wholesale impasse in the EU-Russia relations by demonstrating that a deeper, value-based cooperation is possible *within a narrow but deep sector of partnership*. Even though that sector — RtoP as part of Common Space on external security — is almost non-existent in the EU-Russia political dialogue as a whole, it could be deepened in the future. Moreover, the often repeated political realist predicament, according to which interests usually override values in the EU-Russia relations, turns out to be somewhat misguided and misinformed upon a closer analysis. Within concrete areas of cooperation, the interests and values of the EU and Russia can converge and turn out to be more intertwined and complementary than the 'conventional wisdom' allows us to imagine.

Notes

1 Approximately one-fifth of all oil and natural gas consumed in the EU has been imported from Russia, while Russia's federal budget has been heavily dependent on the revenues obtained from exports to the EU (Aalto 2007: 469).

2 Amnesty International, for example, views the pursuit of economic interests and human rights policy as a zero-sum game, in which the former inevitably constrains the latter: '[T]he interest the EU has in maintaining its close alliance (USA) or developing a "strategic partnership" (China and Russia) tends to compromise the political will to take a strong and consistent stand on human rights' (Amnesty International 2006: 13). The expression 'human rights *vs* Realpolitik' invoked by Amnesty International

reflects the uncompromising logic, according to which it is impossible to balance interests and values in the EU foreign policy.

3　The model of 'emancipatory windows' was first outlined and applied in IR theory by Piiparinen (2010: 177–78).

4　*2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, 60/1, p. 30.

5　Prozorov points out in his reply to Haukkala that his discourse analysis avoids potential ontological reductionism by conceiving of practices as constitutive of material objects: 'In accordance with the Foucauldian archaeological discourse analysis, the practices that I analyse are […] approached in their materiality as acts constitutive of objects, subject positions, concepts and strategies that are deployed in foreign policy […]' (Prozorov 2008: 125). Thus, both material and ideational factors are taken into consideration and synchronised in Prozorov's account.

6　This model is developed here by elaborating and modifying the initial sketch outlined in Piiparinen (2010: 177–78).

7　The term 'dialectic rhythm' applied here is derived from Bhaskar (1998b: xxii).

8　However, the lack of progress in implementing the roadmaps epitomises not only the Third Common Space but the other Common Spaces as well.

9　Interview with Professor Edward Luck in New York on 19 March, 2009; emphasis added.

10　15th EU-Russia Summit, Moscow, 10 May, 2005. *Annex 3: Road Map for the Common Space of External Security*, p. 34; emphasis added.

11　Smith points out that the concept of multipolarity outlined in the Primakov doctrine had already emerged in Russian foreign policy through the thinking of Russia's first post-Soviet foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev (Smith 2005: 37). Klepatskii notes that this strategy was termed 'polycentrism in international policy' in Kozyrev's doctrine as early as 1993 (Klepatskii 2003: 3).

12　15th EU-Russia Summit, Moscow, 10 May, 2005. *Annex 3: Road Map for the Common Space of External Security*, p. 35.

13　Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and Their Member States, of the One Part, and the Russian Federation, of the Other Part, L/CE/RU/en 8.

14　Memorandum (Meeting of Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Dmitri Medvedev on 4 and 5 June, 2010, in Meseberg), available at: http://www.bundesregierung.de/nsc_true/Content/DE/__Anlagen/2010/2010-06-05-meseberg-memorandum,property=publicationFile.pdf/2010-06-05-meseberg-memorandum (accessed 10 December, 2011).

15　Headline Goal 2010, Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May, 2004, Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June, 2004, p. 1.

16　On the hypocritical use of public statements, see Andrew Sayer's critical realist account (Sayer 1992: 38–39).

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